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Abstract—Transactions represent a fundamental component in
blockchains as they are the primary means for users to change the
blockchain state. Current blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum require users to constantly observe the state changes
of interest or the events taking place in a blockchain and requires
the user to explicitly release the required transactions to respond
to the observed events in the blockchain. This paper proposes
EventWarden, a decentralized event-driven proxy service for
users to outsource transactions in Ethereum-like blockchains.
EventWarden employs a novel combination of smart contracts
and blockchain logs. EventWarden allows a user to create a
proxy smart contract that specifies an interested event and also
reserves an arbitrary transaction to release. Upon observing the
occurrence of the prescribed event, anyone in the Blockchain
network can call the proxy contract to earn the service fee
reserved in the contract by proving to the contract that the event
has been recorded into blockchain logs, which then automatically
triggers the proxy contract to release the reserved transaction.
We show that the reserved transaction can only get released
from the proxy contract when the prescribed event has taken
place. We also demonstrate that as long as a single member
in the Blockchain network is incentivized by the service fee to
call the proxy contract after the prescribed event has taken
place, the reserved transaction is guaranteed to get released.
We implement EventWarden over the Ethereum official test
network. The results demonstrate that EventWarden is effective
and is ready-to-use in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains such as Bitcoin [1] and Ethereum [2] are
ledgers of transactions performed by nodes in blockchain
networks on a global state. Transactions form the fundamental
component of blockchains as they are the primary means for
users to change the blockchain state. For example, transactions
allow users to transfer funds among each other in Bitcoin-like
blockchains and in Ethereum-like blockchains that support
smart contracts [3], transactions enable users to create new
smart contracts and invoke functions within existing smart
contracts. Even though many scenarios require users to release
a transaction, it is very common to see that users need to
release transactions for responding to prior state changes in
the blockchain in a timely manner. Thus, current approaches
require users to constantly keep monitoring their interested
events. Event-driven Transaction (ET) refers to a class of
service that enables a user to outsource a transaction to get
executed to change the blockchain state immediately after
a certain state change (or event) has taken place in the
blockchain. Many scenarios require event-driven transactions
in practice. For example, in a smart-contract-powered game
such as the popular CryptoKitties [4] in Ethereum, Alice
may want to purchase a digital kitty with a rare color (i.e.,
via a transaction) once the kitty appears in the market (i.e.,
an event) while Alice may not be capable of watching the
market for days. She may use the event-driven transaction by
outsourcing the transaction to someone else and require the
transaction to get released to purchase the kitty immediately
after the kitty becomes available. In another example, if
Bob attends a smart-contract-powered auction [5] and would
like to increase his bid (i.e., via a transaction) once a
bid higher than his old bid appears (i.e., an event), Bob
may outsource the transaction and require the transaction
to get executed only after the event occurs. Besides the
above-mentioned use cases of event-driven transactions, recent
works on smart-contract-powered applications and protocols
ranging from on-chain designs to side-chain and off-chain
designs are heavily employing an emerging design pattern
called challenge-response [6]–[9], which can also benefit from
adopting event-driven transactions. Specifically, in the design
of a multi-party smart-contract-powered protocol, a naive
design pattern is to first verify the correctness of an action
performed by a participant and then change the blockchain
state based on the verified action. However, the verification of
actions may be quite expensive in Ethereum-like blockchains
and may become even impossible in some cases. In contrast, in
the challenge-response design pattern, each action is assigned
a time period called the challenge period, during which other
participants may choose to challenge the correctness of the
action with counterexamples. Participants performing incorrect
actions will then be found out and their security deposits
will be confiscated. Therefore, the challenge-response design
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pattern incentivizes all participants to stay honest, which
significantly reduces the cost of implementing a protocol.
It is easy to see that the timely responses for challenging
incorrect actions are vital to such designs, otherwise the
designs become insecure. Event-driven transactions can thus
facilitate the emerging challenge-response design pattern
by outsourcing transactions for challenging events such as
disputes or suspicious actions.
Most of the current implementations (e.g., BlueOrion [10]
and Oraclize [11]) of event-driven transactions (ET) are
heavily centralized. These services require the users to entirely
trust the centralized servers and their security properties are
solely limited to a single point of trust. More importantly,
even in scenarios when the service providers are considered
trustworthy, the services are still prone to unpredictable
security breaches or insider attacks that are beyond the control
of the service providers [12], [13]. On the other hand, the
emergence of Blockchain technologies such as Ethereum [2]
and smart contracts [3] provides significant potential for new
security designs that support a decentralized implementation of
ET to overcome the single point of trust issues associated with
centralized approaches. Recently, a few works [7], [14]–[18]
have focused on such decentralized designs in Ethereum.
Nevertheless, their designs only support a certain type of
event (e.g., reach of deadlines, disputes in state channels) or a
single type of transaction in Ethereum (i.e., function invocation
transaction).
In this paper, we propose EventWarden, a decentralized
event-driven proxy service for users to outsource any type
of transaction in Ethereum-like blockchains. EventWarden
employs a novel combination of smart contracts and
blockchain logs. EventWarden allows a user to create a
proxy smart contract that specifies an interested event and also
reserves an arbitrary transaction to release. Upon observing the
occurrence of the prescribed event, anyone in the Blockchain
network can call the proxy contract to earn the service
fee reserved in the contract by proving to the contract that
the event has been recorded into blockchain logs, which
then automatically triggers the proxy contract to release the
reserved transaction. We show that the reserved transaction can
only get released from the proxy contract when the prescribed
event has taken place. We also demonstrate that as long as a
single member in the Blockchain network is incentivized by
the service fee to call the proxy contract after the prescribed
event has taken place, the reserved transaction is guaranteed
to get released.
In summary, this paper makes the following key
contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, EventWarden is the first
decentralized proxy service designed for the general use of
event-driven transactions in Ethereum-like blockchains.
• After the service has been set up, EventWarden
completely isolates the service execution from the state of
users, without requiring any assistance from the user side.
• We emphasize that EventWarden is a general approach
that supports all types of transaction in Ethereum, including
fund transfer transaction, contract creation transaction and
function invocation transaction.
• EventWarden also supports all types of events in
Ethereum as long as the corresponding smart contracts write
events into the blockchain logs.
• We implement EventWarden over the Ethereum official
test network. The results demonstrate that EventWarden
is effective and is straight-forward to be used in practice.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We discuss
related work in Section II and introduce preliminaries in
Section III. In Section IV, we propose the architecture
designed for EventWarden. Then, in Section V, we propose
the protocol designed for EventWarden. We present the
security analysis of EventWarden in Section VI and
the implementation and evaluation of EventWarden in
Section VII. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review related studies and discuss
relevant techniques, which can be roughly divided into four
categories.
A. Native mechanisms
Bitcoin was designed with a native mechanism named
Timelocks [19]. Each transaction in Bitcoin can be set with
a nLocktime and the transaction can only be accepted by the
network after the time point indicated by nLocktime. Besides,
each Bitcoin transaction may involve one or multiple Unspent
Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) and each UTXO may include an
UTXO-level timelock named Check Lock Time Verify (CLTV)
that makes the UTXO available only after the specified time
point. We consider this Timelocks mechanism a good way to
schedule fund transfer transactions and events relative to time,
but it is difficult to be generalized to support other types of
transaction in Ethereum-like blockchains beyond Bitcoin or
other types of events.
B. Client-side tools
There are many tools at the client side that can achieve
event-driven transactions. For example, parity [20], a popular
Ethereum client, allows its users to prescribe a time point
that they would like a transaction to be sent into the
Ethereum network by the client. However, since the scheduled
transaction is locally stored at users’ machines before the
prescribed time point, the usage of such tools demands users’
machines to keep connecting with the blockchain network,
which fails to isolate the service execution with the state of
users.
C. Centralized services
Oraclize [11] is a blockchain oracle service that takes the
role of a trusted third party (TTP) to execute a pre-scheduled
transaction on behalf of a user at a future time point. Similarly,
BlueOrion [10] enables date related payments on the Stellar
Ecosystem [21], an Ethereum-like blockchain. The limitations
of these centralized services include both a single point of
trust and a single point of control.
D. Decentralized services
A recent project called Ethereum Alarm Clock [14] allows
a user to deploy a request contract to the Ethereum network
with a future time-frame as well as a reward and if any account
is interested in the reward, the account can invoke the request
contract during the prescribed time-frame to earn the reward by
making the function invocation transaction maintained by the
request contract get executed. However, this scheme supports
only a single type of transaction and a single type of event,
namely the arrival of prescribed time-frame. A more recent
work [16] further employs threshold secret sharing [22] to
offer privacy protection for scheduling function invocation
transactions that involve sensitive arguments (e.g., bid, vote).
Nevertheless, similar to Ethereum Alarm Clock, this work only
supports function invocation transaction and events relative to
time. Another recent work named PISA [7] enables parties in
state channels to delegate to a third party, called the custodian,
to cancel execution forks on their behalf. However, this work
only supports events relative to state channels.
In summary, our work in this paper tackles the key
limitations of the state-of-the-art decentralized approaches
using smart contracts [7], [14], [16]. That is, by leveraging
proxy contracts and blockchain logs, our scheme supports
all types of transaction (fund transfer, function invocation
and contract creation) in Ethereum, as well as all types
of events in Ethereum as long as the corresponding smart
contracts write events into the blockchain logs. To the best
of our knowledge, EventWarden is the first decentralized
proxy service designed for the general use of event-driven
transactions in Ethereum-like blockchains.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the preliminaries about smart
contracts and Ethereum. While we discuss smart contracts in
the context of Ethereum [3], we note that our solutions are also
applicable to a wide range of other Ethereum-like blockchains.
A. Account types
There are two types of accounts in Ethereum, namely
External Owned Accounts (EOAs) and Contract Accounts
(CAs). To interact with the Ethereum blockchain, a user
needs to own an EOA by locally creating a pair of keys.
Specifically, the public key pkEOA can generate a 20-byte
address addr(EOA) to uniquely identify the EOA and the
private key skEOA can be used by the user to sign transactions
or other types of data. Then, any user can create a smart
contract by sending out a contract creation transaction from a
controlled EOA. The 20-byte address addr(CA) of the created
smart contract is generated in a deterministic and predictable
way and becomes the unique identity of the contract account.
B. Transactions and messages
The state of Ethereum blockchain can only be changed
by the external world (i.e., EOAs) using transactions. A
transaction is a serialized binary message sent from an EOA
that contains the following key elements:
• recipient: the recipient account address;
• value: the amount of ether1 to send to the recipient;
• data: the binary data payload;
Depending on the type of recipient, transactions can be
divided into three categories.
Fund transfer transaction: A transaction with an EOA as
recipient and a non-empty value is a fund transfer transaction,
which is used to transfer an amount of ether from the EOA
creating the transaction to the recipient EOA.
Function invocation transaction: When a transaction
involves an CA as recipient as well as a non-empty data, it is
usually a function invocation transaction for calling a function
within an existing smart contract.
Contract creation transaction: In Ethereum, there is a special
type of transaction for creating new smart contracts. Such
a transaction, usually called a contract creation transaction,
carries a special recipient address 0x0, an empty value and
a non-empty data payload. A smart contract (or contract) in
Ethereum is a piece of program created using a high-level
contract-oriented programming language such as Solidity [23].
After compiling into a low-level bytecode language called
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) code, the created contract is
filled into a contract creation transaction as the data payload.
To make the transaction get executed to change the state of
Ethereum blockchain, the transaction should be broadcasted to
the entire Ethereum network formed by tens of thousands of
miner nodes. Following the Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus
protocol [1], all the miners in Ethereum competitively solve
a blockchain puzzle and the winner packages the received
transactions into a block and appends the new block to the
end of Ethereum blockchain. From then on, it is hard to
tamper with the blockchain state updated by the transaction
(i.e., transferred fund, executed function or created contract)
as each miner maintains a copy of the new block and is aware
of changes made by transactions within the new block and an
adversary has to falsify majority of these copies in order to
change the network consensus about the glocal state.
There is another important concept in Ethereum that is
highly relevant to transactions (or tx), namely the messages
(or msg). In Ethereum, smart contracts can be programmed in
a way that enables EVM-level opcodes for system operations,
such as CREATE and CALL, through which contracts are
able to perform advanced operations such as creating new
contracts or calling other contracts by sending out messages
to change the blockchain state. It is worth noting that CAs
are not able to change the blockchain state by themselves.
Instead, any message creation at a CA must be triggered by
a transaction sent from EOAs or another message created at
other CAs, which is also triggered by EOAs from the root.
This property offers two approaches to update the state of a
smart contract (say, CA1) in Ethereum: (1) send a function
invocation transaction (tx) to CA1, which directly updates the
state of CA1; (2) send a tx to another contract CA2, where the
tx triggers CA2 to send a message msg to CA1 and update
1 The native cryptocurrency in Ethereum, denoted by Ξ.
notation description
U a user of Event-driven Transaction (ET)
E an executor in ET
C a smart contract
C.fun() function fun() within contract C
⇒ invoke a function within a contract
addr(∗) an address of an EOA or a CA
TABLE I: Summary of notations.
the state of CA1. In fact, our study found that the second
approach supports not only function invocation transactions,
but also the other two types of transactions in Ethereum.
C. Gas system
In order to either deploy a new contract or call a deployed
contract in Ethereum, one needs to spend Gas. Based on the
complexity of the contract or that of the called function, an
amount of ether needs to be spent in order to purchase an
amount of Gas, which is then paid to the miner that creates
the new block.
D. Events and logs
Events are inheritable members of smart contracts and are
used for emphasizing the effect of each transaction [3]. When
an event is called along with a function invocation transaction,
the LOG opcodes in Ethereum virtual machine store the
event in the transactions log, as a part of the transaction
receipt. These logs are associated with the address of the
contract and will be incorporated into the blockchain and
stay there as long as a block is accessible. Meanwhile, each
block maintains a Merkle Patricia tree for receipts of all
transactions within the block and the root of this tree, denoted
as the receiptsRoot, is stored in the block header. Therefore,
a contract similar to CryptoKitties [4] may be designed in
a way such that each function invocation transaction for
releasing a kitty to the market notifies the appearance of
the kitty with an event describing the properties of the kitty
(e.g., event(kitty color)). Similarly, an auction contract may
employ events to notify the update of the highest bid (e.g.,
event(updated)). With events, users are capable of tracking
the state changes of interested smart contracts in a very
efficient way. Moreover, the facts that events are recorded in
transaction receipts as logs and the Merkle root of transaction
receipts are written into block header imply that the existence
of events is provable using receiptsRoot and the reliability of
the Merkle proof is endorsed by the reliability of blockchain.
Motivated by these findings, we employ events and logs in the
design of EventWarden.
In the next two sections, we present the architecture
and protocol designed for EventWarden, respectively. We
summarize the notations that will be used in this section and
in the rest of this paper in TABLE I.
IV. EVENTWARDEN: ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first present the key components
of the architecture for event-driven transactions. We
then present a naive user-driven architecture and finally
introduce the proxy-contract-driven architecture designed for
EventWarden.
A. The four key components
An architecture for event-driven transaction (ET) includes
four key components. First, it requires a storage place for
maintaining the elements of a scheduled transaction, including
recipient, value and data presented in Section III-B. Second, it
requires an amount of ether not less than the amount indicated
by the value element, which is guaranteed to be available when
the event occurs. Third, it requires an EOA to execute the
broadcasting of scheduled transaction after the event to change
the blockchain state as expected. Finally, it requires the logic
to indicate the occurrence of the event. We summarize the four
components as et-data, et-ether, et-executor and et-logic.
Next, we present two different architectures for ET and
discuss how they handle the four key components, respectively.
We start by introducing the user-driven architecture shown
in Fig. 1.(a), where ET is simply performed by a user who
needs to handle all these components by herself and also needs
to keep connecting with the blockchain network. We then
introduce the proxy-contract-driven architecture in Fig. 1.(b),
where a proxy contract is employed to manage et-data, et-ether
and et-logic and an EOA is recruited to take the role of
et-executor so that the user is totally relieved from all the
burdens of handling components and keeping on-line.
B. The user-driven architecture
As introduced in Section III-B, a straight-forward approach
of implementing event-driven transactions would be to ask the
user to store the elements of the scheduled transaction at her
local machine and make the transaction get broadcasted via a
client-side tool such as parity [20] once an event occurs. In this
scenario, user stores et-data at a local machine (i.e., a PC) with
the local programs handling et-logic and employs a controlled
EOA to both provide et-ether and serve as et-executor.
Then, upon finding an occurrence of the prescribed event,
the client-side tool pushes the scheduled transaction into the
blockchain network from the local machine and the amount
of ether indicated by the value element is transferred from
the controlled EOA to the address indicated by the recipient
element. In summary, this user-driven architecture is easy
to be implemented. However, even though this approach
allows a user to be physically absent during the occurrence
of events, it still demands the local machine that maintains
et-data to be connected with the blockchain network, which
makes user-driven architecture hard to be adopted as a general
approach that can isolates the service execution completely
from the user side after the service has been set up.
C. The proxy-contract-driven architecture
To isolate the service execution from the user side, all
the four components need to be migrated from the user. A
naive way of realizing this goal would be to ask the user
to outsource all the components to an EOA recruited from
the Ethereum network so that the recruited EOA would be
Fig. 1: The architectures for Event-driven Transaction. (a) the user-driven architecture (b) the proxy-contract-driven architecture.
able to complete ET on behalf of the user. However, there
are three severe consequences that are likely to occur: (1) the
recruited EOA may falsify et-data; (2) the recruited EOA may
embezzle received et-ether; (3) the recruited EOA may violate
the indication of et-logic. All these undesirable execution
results can hardly be prevented in this naive approach. Hence,
a natural question is that, can we design an architecture for
ET that offers all-or-nothing execution results? That is, we
would like either the scheduled transaction to be correctly
executed along with the occurrence of the prescribed event,
or the scheduled transaction to be never executed and the
et-ether to be transferred back to the user. To achieve this
goal, we recognize that et-data, et-ether and et-logic need to
be handled by a trusted party and executed in a deterministic
manner, so we design a proxy smart contract (Cproxy) that can
act on behalf of a user to manage the three components in a
decentralized, trustworthy and deterministic way.
Algorithm 1: Proxy contract logic
Input : blockNum, blockData,MerkleProof, et-event,
et-data, et-ether.
Output: msg.
1 receiptsRoot← verifyBlock(blockNum, blockData);
2 receipt← verifyProof(receiptsRoot,MerkleProof);
3 result← verifylog(receipt, et-event);
4 if result == TRUE then
5 msgRelease(et-data, et-ether);
6 end
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, with the proxy contract, ET
can get completed in two steps:
• Event verify: Immediately after the event occurs, any EOA
in Ethereum is capable of calling the proxy contract
Cproxy with a function invocation transaction taking three
arguments, namely the number of block carrying the
event as log inside a transaction receipt (blockNum), the
data of that block (blockData) and the Merkle proof
for proving the existence of the receipt (MerkleProof ).
With these arguments, the proxy contract is capable of
first verifying the correctness of blockData according to
blockNum and fetching the receiptsRoot from blockData
(line 1), then verifying the existence of the declared receipt
using MerkleProof and receiptsRoot (line 2) and finally
verifying the existence of the declared log and checking
whether the log is equivalent to the event prescribed by
user, namely et-event (line 3).
• Message release: In case that the log correctly indicates
the occurrence of the prescribed event, the proxy contract
releases the reserved transaction by sending out a message
using et-data and et-ether.
The proxy-contract-driven architecture can effectively
prevent the three undesirable consequences: (1) the data
recorded in Cproxy, namely et-data, can only get compromised
by attacking the Ethereum blockchain; (2) the amount of
ether in Cproxy , namely et-ether, is only allowed to be
either transferred to the address of recipient or to the user
using a native selfdestruct function, so no one would be able
to embezzle et-ether; (3) the correctness of implementation
of et-logic is provable, which we leave to Section VI to
present in detail. Next, we present the protocol designed for
EventWarden.
V. EVENTWARDEN: PROTOCOL
In this section, we start by describing the event-driven
transaction (ET) as a two-phase process in the context
of the proposed proxy-contract-driven architecture. We then
present the protocol designed for EventWarden. Throughout
Section V, we assume that the user is scheduling a function
invocation transaction to call a function within a target smart
contract denoted as Ctarget. While we present the protocols
in the context of a single type of transaction, we note that our
protocols are also applicable to the other two types.
A. ET as a two-phase process
We describe the ET problem as a two-phase process in the
context of the proposed proxy-contract-driven architecture:
• ET.schedule: The user U creates a proxy contract Cproxy
with a balance (if needed) and sends her service request to
Fig. 2: Protocol sketch
a service hub contract Chub, which notifies the Cproxy to
potential executors Es.
• ET.execute: Upon detecting the occurrence of the event
specified in Cproxy, executor E can invoke Cproxy with a
function invocation transaction to trigger the release of the
reserved transaction in the form of a message.
B. The protocol
We now present the protocol in detail. We sketch the
protocol in Fig. 2 and present the formal description in Fig. 3.
Concretely, the protocol employs a service hub contract (Chub)
to manage all ET service requests, so executors only need to
track events released from Chub to get notified about new ET
service requests. We next describe the two-phase process in
detail.
ET.schedule: User U first deploys a proxy contract Cproxy .
User U then needs to send an amount of ether via function
charge() to Cproxy . The amount of ether received by Cproxy
should be the sum of service fee for paying the executor and
et-ether (if not empty). After that, user U sets up a new ET
service with Chub via function newService() and specifies
the service details, namely the address (i.e., addr(∗)) of the
proxy contract Cproxy. Upon getting notified by Chub about
this new service request, executors Es can start monitoring the
occurrence of the event specified in the corresponding Cproxy .
ET.execute: Upon detecting the occurrence of the event
specified in Cproxy, any executor E is capable of constructing
blockNum, blockData and MerkleProof locally and call
function eventV erify() inside Cproxy with a function
invocation transaction. Upon getting invoked, function
eventV erify() follows Algorithm 1 to verify the occurrence
of the specified event. Function eventV erify() then call
a private msgRelease() function to release the prescribed
message and then transfer the service fee to the executor.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis for the
proposed EventWarden.
Lemma 1. The reserved transaction can only get released
from the proxy contract when the prescribed event has taken
place.
ET.schedule:
1. User U deploys a proxy contract Cproxy .
2. User U ⇒ Cproxy: charge(ether).
3. User U ⇒ Chub: newService(addr(Cproxy)).
ET.execute:
4. Any executor E ⇒ Cproxy.eventV erify(blockNum,
blockData,MerkleProof).
Fig. 3: Formal protocol
Proof. As illustrated in Algorithm 1, upon getting invoked by
a function invocation transaction, the logic inside the proxy
contract, namely the eventV erify() function would verify
the occurrence of the prescribed event before releasing the
reserved transaction. Concretely, verifying the occurrence of
the prescribed event is equivalent to verifying the existence of
the log for storing the event in the blockchain. As presented
in Section III-D, the reliability of the verification is endorsed
by the reliability of blockchain. Together, as long as we could
trust the blockchain, we could also trust the correctness of the
verification done in the proxy contract.
Lemma 2. As long as a single member in Ethereum is
incentivized by the service fee to call the proxy contract after
the prescribed event has taken place, the reserved transaction
is guaranteed to get released.
Proof. As we have discussed in Section IV-C, the proposed
proxy-contract-driven architecture isolates et-executor from
et-data, et-ether and et-logic. Concretely, EventWarden
outlines no eligibility requirements for becoming executors.
Any EOA in Ethereum are eligible for providing services for
EventWarden. This is because that the vital components,
namely et-data, et-ether and et-logic are maintained by
the trustworthy proxy contract, so the need for verifying
the qualification of executors is minimized. Thanks to this
strategy, every member from the huge Ethereum community
becomes a potential service provider for EventWarden and
the solid underlying community could make EventWarden
easier to get launched in practice. Moreover, anyone in
Ethereum is capable of constructing blockNum, blockData
and MerkleProof locally and calling the eventV erify()
function to complete the service, so the service is completely
decentralized. This fact also facilitates the reliability of the
service because it is impracticable for anyone to intercept all
function invocation transactions sent by different EOAs from
different places in the world for calling eventV erify().
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we present the implementation and
evaluation for EventWarden in detail.
A. Implementation
We programmed both the proxy contract and hub
contract using the contract-oriented programming language
Solidity [23] and we tested the contracts over the Ethereum
official test network Rinkeby [24]. We employed the
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 5 . 0 ;
2 import "RLPReader.sol" ;
3
4 c o n t r a c t C proxy {
5 . . .
6 us ing RLPReader f o r RLPReader . RLPItem ;
7 us ing RLPReader f o r b y t e s ;
8 f u n c t i o n e v e n t V e r i f y (
9 b y t e s memory r l p B l o c k D a t a , u i n t blockNum ,
10 b y t e s memory r l pMerk leRoo t , u i n t idMerk leRoot ,
11 b y t e s memory r l pMerk l eBranch , u i n t idMerk leBranch ,
12 b y t e s memory r l p M e r k l e L e a f
13 ) p u b l i c {
14 // event verify
15 r e q u i r e ( keccak256 ( r l p B l o c k D a t a ) ==
16 blockhash ( blockNum ) ) ;
17 RLPReader . RLPItem [ ] memory l s B l o c k H e a d e r =
18 r l p B l o c k D a t a . t o R l p I t e m ( ) . t o L i s t ( ) ;
19 bytes32 r e c e i p t s R o o t =
20 bytes32 ( l s B l o c k H e a d e r [ 5 ] . t o U i n t ( ) ) ;
21 r e q u i r e ( keccak256 ( r l p M e r k l e R o o t ) == r e c e i p t s R o o t ) ;
22 RLPReader . RLPItem [ ] memory l s M e r k l e R o o t =
23 r l p M e r k l e R o o t . t o R l p I t e m ( ) . t o L i s t ( ) ;
24 bytes32 merk leBranch =
25 bytes32 ( l s M e r k l e R o o t [ idMerk leRoo t ] . t o U i n t ( ) ) ;
26 r e q u i r e ( keccak256 ( r l p M e r k l e B r a n c h ) == merk leBranch ) ;
27 RLPReader . RLPItem [ ] memory l s M e r k l e B r a n c h =
28 r l p M e r k l e B r a n c h . t o R l p I t e m ( ) . t o L i s t ( ) ;
29 bytes32 m e r k l e L e a f =
30 bytes32 ( l s M e r k l e B r a n c h [ idMerk leBranch ] . t o U i n t ( ) ) ;
31 r e q u i r e ( keccak256 ( r l p M e r k l e L e a f ) == m e r k l e L e a f ) ;
32 RLPReader . RLPItem [ ] memory l s M e r k l e L e a f =
33 r l p M e r k l e L e a f . t o R l p I t e m ( ) . t o L i s t ( ) ;
34 b y t e s memory r l p R e c e i p t = l s M e r k l e L e a f [ 1 ] . t o B y t e s ( ) ;
35 RLPReader . RLPItem [ ] memory l s R e c e i p t =
36 r l p R e c e i p t . t o R l p I t e m ( ) . t o L i s t ( ) ;
37 b y t e s memory r l pL og = l s R e c e i p t [ 3 ] . t o B y t e s ( ) ;
38 r e q u i r e ( keccak256 ( r l pL og ) == s p e c i f i e d E v e n t ) ;
39 // message release
40 msgRelease ( ) ;
41 msg . sender . t r a n s f e r ( s e r v i c e f e e ) ;
42 }
43 . . .
44 }
Function 1: The eventVerify() function
1 c o n t r a c t C proxy {
2 . . .
3 address payable r e c i p i e n t = . . . ;
4 u i n t v a l u e = . . . ;
5 f u n c t i o n f u n d T r a n s f e r ( ) p r i v a t e {
6 r e c i p i e n t . t r a n s f e r ( v a l u e ) ;
7 }
8
9 address r e c i p i e n t = . . . ;
10 s t r i n g f u n c t i o n s e l e c t o r = . . . ;
11 u i n t a rg1 ;
12 u i n t a rg2 ;
13 f u n c t i o n f u n c t i o n I n v o c a t i o n ( ) p r i v a t e {
14 r e c i p i e n t . c a l l ( a b i . e n c o d e W i t h S i g n a t u r e (
15 f u n c t i o n s e l e c t o r , arg1 , a rg2 ) ) ;
16 }
17
18 b y t e s b y t e c o d e = . . . ;
19 f u n c t i o n c o n t r a c t C r e a t i o n ( ) p r i v a t e {
20 address deployedAddr ;
21 b y t e s memory bc = b y t e c o d e ;
22 assembly {
23 deployedAddr := c r e a t e ( 0 , add ( bc , 0x20 ) , mload ( bc ) )
24 }
25 }
26 . . .
27 }
Function 2: The msgRelease() function
solidity-rlp library [25] for decoding data encoded with the
Ethereum RLP (Recursive Length Prefix) rules [3] in smart
contracts. Next, we present our detailed implementation for
the two most challenging functions, namely eventVerify() and
msgRelease(), respectively.
The implementation for function eventVerify() in the proxy
contract Cproxy is shown as Function 1. The contract
’RLPReader.sol’ is imported (line 2,6-7) from the solidity-rlp
library for decoding encoded data input to the eventVerify()
function. The functions verifyBlock(), verifyProof() and
verifyLog() specified in Algorithm 1 are implemented at line
15-20, line 21-34 and line 35-37 in Function 1, respectively.
Specifically, verifyBlock() is implemented by first fetching
the hash of block specified by the input blockNum from
the blockchain and verifying that the input rlpBlockData
has the same hash value (line 15-16), then decoding the
input rlpBlockData as a list of components (line 17-18)
and finally picking out the value for receiptsRoot from
the list (line 19-20). After that, verifyProof() is implemented
by first verifying the input rlpMerkleRoot and decoding
rlpMerkleRoot to get the hashed value for the branch
node on the path of Merkle proof, namely merkleBranch
(line 21-25), then verifying the input rlpMerkleBranch
and decoding it to get the hashed value for the leaf node
merkleLeaf (line 26-30) and finally verifying the input
rlpMerkleLeaf and decoding it to get the data for the
declared transaction receipt rlpReceipt (line 31-34). In the
third step, verifyLog() is implemented by decoding rlpReceipt
to get the data for the declared log rlpLog (line 35-37).
Finally, after verifying the equivalence between the log and the
specified event (line 38), msgRelease() is invoked to release
the reserved transaction (line 40) and the service fee is sent
to the executor (line 41).
The function msgRelease() could be implemented as one
of three functions shown in Function 2, which depends on
the type of reserved transaction. Specifically, msgRelease()
for releasing a reserved fund transfer transaction, a reserved
function invocation transaction or a reserved contract creation
transaction could be implemented as line 3-7, line 9-16 or line
18-25 in Function 2, respectively.
B. Evaluation
Similar to recent work on blockchain-based platforms and
protocols [26], [27], the key focus of our evaluation is on
measuring gas consumption, namely the amount of transaction
fees spent in the protocol. This is due to the fact that
the execution complexity in Ethereum is measured via gas
consumption. It is worth noting that, in Ethereum, the amount
of gas that a single transaction may spend is bounded by a
system parameter and hence, the time overhead of executing
functions inside smart contracts is small, usually in the scale
of hundreds of milliseconds.
In TABLE II, we list the key functions in the programmed
smart contracts that interact with protocol participants during
different phases of the protocol and the cost of these functions
in both Gas and USD. The cost in USD was computed through
Phase Step Function Gas UDS
ET.schedule
1 deploy Cproxy 889764 $2.60
2 charge() 21497 $0.06
3 newService() 45612 $0.13
ET.execute 4 eventV erify() 175674 $0.51
Other close() 13662 $0.04
TABLE II: Key functions and their cost in Gas and USD.
cost(USD) = cost(Gas) ∗ GasToEther ∗ EtherToUSD,
where GasToEther and EtherToUSD were taken as their
mean value during the first half of the year 2019 recorded
in Etherscan [28], which are 1.67 ∗ 10−8 Ether/Gas and
175 USD/Ether, respectively. As illustrated by the results, in
EventWarden, the completion of a service only requires a
user to deploy the proxy contract Cproxy ($2.60), transfer the
required amount of ether to Cproxy via function charge()
($0.06) and set up a new service at the hub contract Chub
via function newService() ($0.20) during ET.schedule and
an executor to invoke eventVerify() ($0.51) during ET.execute,
which costs only $3.30 in total. The user may also choose to
call function close() to shut down the service and get back
her ether from the proxy contract, which costs $0.04.
In summary, our implementation and evaluation demonstrate
that EventWarden is effective and is ready-to-use.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes EventWarden, a decentralized
event-driven proxy service for users to outsource any type
of transaction in Ethereum-like blockchains. EventWarden
employs a novel combination of smart contracts and
blockchain logs. EventWarden allows a user to create a
proxy smart contract that specifies an interested event and also
reserves an arbitrary transaction to release. Upon observing the
occurrence of the prescribed event, anyone in the Blockchain
network can call the proxy contract to earn the service
fee reserved in the contract by proving to the contract that
the event has been recorded into blockchain logs, which
then automatically triggers the proxy contract to release the
reserved transaction. We show that the reserved transaction can
only get released from the proxy contract when the prescribed
event has taken place. We also demonstrate that as long as a
single member in the Blockchain network is incentivized by
the service fee to call the proxy contract after the prescribed
event has taken place, the reserved transaction is guaranteed
to get released. We implement EventWarden over the
Ethereum official test network. The results demonstrate that
EventWarden is effective and is ready to be used in practice.
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